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Relationship Investing: ·Will It Happen?
Will It Work?
JILL E. FISCH

*

I . I NTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, in

The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 1

Berl e and Means explained that the separation of ownership and control in
the modern public corporation interferes with the ability of stockholders
effectively to monitor corporate decisionmakers. More recently , scholars
have elaborated on Berle and Means' hypothesis, explaining that agency
costs and collective action problems both limit the ability of shareholders

to monitor and reduce the financial incentives to do so. 2
Current academic scholarship

suggests a possible

solution to the

problem of inadequate monitoring by shareholders. Responding to ongoing
changes in the nature of shareholding, particularly the move from dispersed
individual shareholders to an aggregation of holdings in mutual funds,
pension funds, and insurance companies, commentators argue that the
growth

of institutional

investors

provides

the

answer

to
problems of shareholder participation in corporate governance. 3

traditional

• Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B .A., Cornell
University, 1 982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am grateful to Marc Arkin, Joel
Seligman, Steve Thel, Bill Treanor and my mother for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article and to the participants in the George Mason University
School of Law Faculty Workshop Series for their helpful critiques.
1 ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C . MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRNATE PROPERTY (1932).
2 See, e.g. , Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 454 n.29 ( 1 99 1) (summarizing
literature discussing collective action problem in the corporate context) . For an
overview of the problem associated with collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LCXJIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1 97 1) .
3 See, e.g. , Bernard S . Black, Agents Watching Agents: Th e Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 8 1 1 , 830-49 (1992) [hereinafter Black,
Agents Watching Agents] ; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991);
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Advocates of institutional investor activism assert that institutions,
because of their larger investment stake and better access to information,
can

monitor

corporate

decisionmaking

more

easily

than

individual

shareholders, and that the larger p roportionate holdings of these investors
make monitoring more profitabl e, overcoming collective action p roblems.4
Using models that portray money spent on monitoring as an investment,
these scholars argue that, as the size of an investor's shareholdings in a
company grows, the cost of monitoring is more easily justified. Hence the
large investor, commonly the institutional investor, is more l ikely to
monitor.
The investment community has most recently focused its attention on a
new

form

of investor

activism:

relationship

investing .5

Relationship

investing may be described as a large l ong-term financial commitment by
an investor to a portfolio company in exchange for a say as to how it is
run. 6

Promoters

of relationship

investing

tout

it

as

a

vehicle

for

establishing l ong-term advisory relationships between institutional investors
and the companies in which they invest. 7 They argue that relationship
investing will p rovide accountability for management through the p resence
of investors with a sufficient stake to monitor. 8 Because of its l ong-term

Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of Institutional Investors
in Corporate Governance, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 376, 3 8 1-82 (1 992); BernardS. B lack,
Beyond Proxy Reform, INSIGHTS (Mar. 1 993), at 2 [hereinafter B lack, Beyond Proxy
Reform] .
4 See, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing
Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 107 1 , 108 1 ( 1990); George W.
Dent, Jr. , Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation , 1989
Wrs. L. REv. 8 8 1 , 907; Henry T . C . Hu, Risk, Time and Fidudary Prindples in
Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 374 (1 990).
5 See, e.g. , Judith H. Dobrzynski, Relationship Investing, Bus. WK., Mar. 15,
1 993 , at 68 (describing relationship i nvesting as "[a] provocative new i nvestment
idea"); Felix Rohatyn, Dinner Address at the Relational Investing Conference (New
York, May 6, 1 993) (on file with author) ('"Relationships' are now i n vogue . ... ").
In May, 1993 , the Columbia Institutional Investor Proj ect sponsored a two-day
conference on relationship investing, which i nvolved the most extensive treatment of
the subject to date.
6 Martin Dickson, Crusaders in the Capitalist Cause: U.S. Shareholder Activists
Are Gearing Up to Make Underpeifonning Managements More Accountable, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1 993 , at 17; cJ. Dobrzynski, supra note 5, at 68 (describing
relationship i nvesting as any established committed link between a company and one
or more of its shareholders) .
7 David Vise, Shifting the Boardroom Balance of Power, WASH. PosT, Mar. 6,
1993 , at D l.
8 Dobrzynski, supra note 5 .
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orientation, relationship investing is also more palatable pol itically, as it
responds to the common criticism that institutional investors are focused
too heavily on the short term . 9
A few skeptics question the premise that institutional investors will be
able to engage in more effective monitoring than traditional shareholders.
One issue is whether institutions will accept the l imitations on investment
flexibil ity10 that may result from more active participation in corporate
governance. 11

Another

concern

is

whether

institutions

possess

the

necessary expertise to monitor effectively, even if they are willing to

monitor. 12

Political

constraints also restrict the activism of many
institutional investors . 1 3 F inally, various state and federal laws prevent

some institutions from active participation in corporate governance, and
public concerns about the appropriate role and balance of power for such
institutions may l imit legal reform. 14
This Article challenges the received academic wisdom in favor of
relationship investing from another and more fundamental perspective: it
argues that relationship investing is less attractive to the rational investor
and hence

less

likely

to

occur

than

its

advocates have

contended .

Relationship investing will be the exception, not the rule, unless the
companies

concerned

are

allowed

to

confer

special

benefits

on the

relationship investor. There has been no showing, to date, that such
benefits are warranted .
The focus of this Article is on the traditional economic model that
explains the investor's decision to monitor in terms of an evaluation of the
relative costs and benefits of monitoring. The Article concludes that the
traditional model is incomplete because it does not adequately account for
the

competitive

environment

in

which

institutions

operate

and

are

9 Id.

10 Long-term activism may require an investor to sacrifice liquidity. See John C.

Coffee, Jr. , Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991) . In addition, certain types of participation in
corporate governance, such as board representation, may place additional limits on an
investor's freedom to trade by, for example, subjecting the investor to insider trading
liability or liability for short swing trading under § 1 6 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
11 See id. (questioning whether institutional investors will sacrifice liquidity for
greater control over portfolio companies) .
12 E.g. , Vanecko, supra note 3 , at 406-08.
1 3 E.g. , Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993).
14 E.g. , Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 469 (199 1).

-
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evaluated. The model is premised on the assumption that investors will
monitor whenever monitoring increases their profits in absolute terms . It
fails to account for the fact that the performance of many institutional
investors is evaluated on a comparative rather than an absolute basis . In
other words, a rational investor will not monitor if monitoring confers
greater benefits on competitors who , as free riders, are able to b enefit from
the stock price increases caused by the monitoring without incurring its
costs.
Judging investments in comparative rather than absolute terms affects
the operation of the model and causes the rational institutional investor to
invest less in monitoring than traditional theory would indicate. Moreover,
in order

for

an investor

to

benefit,

on

a

comparative basis,

from

monitoring, it must increase its rel ative stake in the target company. This
concentration, because it increases the risk of the investment,

again

increases the cost of monitoring. This Article will demonstrate the effect of
this approach o n the economic model of monitoring and demonstrate that,
because of these additions to the model , institutional activism is less likely
to occur than traditional theory would indicate.
The role of competition in the monitoring decision helps explain why
few institutions have engaged in relationship investing. This Article also
evaluates recent evidence on the extent of institutional activism and argues
that the creation of an opportunity for a large investor to obtain private
gains 1 5 better explains the existence of specific relationships than the
enhancement of corporate decisionmaking.
The ability to generate private gains operates to counter some of the
effects of competition and to make institutional activism more l ikel y . If we
wish to see relationship investing play a significant role in the economy,
the l aw will have to facilitate, or at least not hinder, transactions that allow
the creation of private gains . Changing the law is appropriate, however,
only if relationship investing improves corporate performance. In its final
section, drawing on previous

critiques of relationship

investing,

Article

evidence

of relationship

examines

the

limited

on

the

value

this

investing.

1 5 Private gains are returns from relationship investing that accrue to the activist

shareholder in some proportion greater than the shareholder's pro rata interest in the
company. See discussion infra part IV.C.

?
l
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II. SHAREHOLDER MONITORING AND THE PROMISE OF
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE

Classical corporate theory is , by and l arge, based on the notion of
shareholder primacy . 1 6 Although state statutes provide that the corporation
is to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors, 1 7
management decisions are supposed to be made with a view to promoting
the interests of shareholders . The justification for this approach is twofold.
First, under classical theories of the corporation, shareholders have the
l egal status of owners . 18 Second, economic theory dictates that
management decisions designed to promote the interests of the residual
owners of the corporation are most efficient. 19 Accordingly, increasing the

t

t
i

+
l!

t
l
f
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l

!

r
l

'

1'
!

T

t
t
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16 Members of the modern corporate governance community are divided into two
camps: the shareholder primacy camp and the stakeholder camp. The former believe
that problems of corporate performance can be attributed to a lack of corporate
responsiveness to the needs of shareholders and rectified by solutions that reduce the
separation between ownership and control. The latter believe that corporations are
properly responsive to the needs of a variety of stakeholders, including employees,
creditors, and members of the community and that corporations should be less rather
than more responsive to the needs of shareholders. Because relationship investing is
advocated as a tool for increasing shareholder primacy, it is unnecessary to examine
the stakeholder model in further detail here. To the extent that advocates of the
German and Japanese governance models have characterized relationship investing as
stakeholder-oriented, based on its ability to further the interests of creditors (banks) in
the German model, and customers and suppliers in the Japanese model, this process
can alternatively be described as the creation, by these "dual role" investors, of
private gains. See, e.g. , Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis
of the International Experience (working paper presented at Columbia 1993
symposium); see infra part IV.C (discussing private gains).
1 7 See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs
of every corporation ...shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors ...."); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("the business and affairs
of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under the direction of the board."); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 701 (Consol. 1994)
("[t]he business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of
directors ....") .
1 8 E.g. , Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589 (1933) (describing shareholders as
"the real owners of the corporate property "); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d
1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990); In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (N.Y. 1899) (citing
cases). See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Finn:
Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989).
19 See, e.g. , Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium, Fundamental Corporate Changes:
Causes, Effects and Legal Responses: Externalities, Finn-Specifi c Capital Investments,
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fidelity of management decisions to shareholder interests will improve
corporate performance. 2o
As Berle and Means recognized, the separation of ownership and
control in the public corporation creates a problem with this approach to
corporate governance. The separation of ownership and control results in
management by nonowners whose interests diverge from those of the
shareholders on whose behalf management decisions are made. 2 1 This
and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental and Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1 73 , 1 80-8 1 ; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Qaims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 (1983); Oliver Williamson, Organizational
Form, Residual Qaimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 3 5 1 ( 1983).
This efficiency results from two factors. First, specialized management is likely to
outperform diversified owners with respect to the quality of corporate decisions. See,
e.g. , ALFRED D . CHANDLER, JR. , S CALE AND S COPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 232 ( 1990) (arguing that separation of ownership and control developed
as response to increasing complexity of modern business) . Second , commentators
argue that the interests of the residual owners , in terms of risk and reward, are most
closely akin to the long-term interests of the corporation. Accordingly, a structure that
maximizes shareholder value is likely to maximize corporate value. See, e.g. , Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. E CON. REv. 777 (1972) ; see also ROBERTA RoMANO, THE
GENIUS OP AMERICAN C ORPORATE LAW 2-3 (AEI Press 1993) (explaining that
shareholder primacy model provides clear-cut decisional rule for managers, allocates
capital resources and "best matches organizational design with incentives") ; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423 , 143 8 (1993) (defending shareholder
wealth maximization model of corporate governance as best able to constrain
management sin, because other models allow management to "pursue its own self
interest by playing shareholders off against nonshareholders").
20 The call for increased shareholder monitoring to improve corporate
performance is based on two fundamental premises: (1) that corporate governance
matters in improving corporate performance, and (2) that U.S. corporate performance
is declining, either in absolute terms or relative to international competitors such as
German or Japanese corporations, and requires improvement. For a more detailed
analysis of the first point, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors:
A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 C OLUM. L. REv. 124-25 n. 1 (1 994) (discussing
relationship between corporate governance and performance) . On the second point,
see Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 Bus. LAW. 1 485 , 1 487
(1993) (arguing that a general consensus has found U.S. corporate performance to
have fallen behind that of our competitors and concluding that corporate governance
can have an "obvious" impact on corporate performance and hence competitiveness).
2 1 See generally Jill E. Fisch , Frankenstein 's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 587, 633-35 (1991) (describing separation of ownership and control and legal
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results in agency costs that prevent the corporation from being operated in
the most efficient and profitable manner possible. 22
Monitoring is one way to reduce agency costs . 23 The active
participation of shareholders in monitoring corporate management,
according to traditional corporate theory, can improve the performance of
the corporation. 24 Corporate law is based on the premise that shareholder
monitoring is valuable; it provides a number of mechanisms by which
shareholders can review management decisions and correct improprieties . 25
Monitoring, however, is not free. Every instance of shareholder
responses designed to minimize the problems of agent malfeasance).
22 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J . FIN. EcoN. 305,
308-10 (1976) (describing agency costs created by separation of ownership from
control).
23 One criticism that might be leveled at the literature on shareholder activism is
its frequent failure to define or distinguish between different monitoring activities.
See, e.g. , Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 3, at 813 n.3 (using the terms
"monitoring" and "oversight" "interchangeably to refer to the various actions, direct
and indirect, formal and informal, that institutional investors can take to assess
corporate manager performance and to influence corporate actions"). Monitoring can
run the gamut from actively analyzing corporate information and intelligently
exercising the corporate franchise, to sponsoring shareholder proposals or making
efforts to influence management policy through negotiations with management, to
efforts to obtain board representation or effect a complete change in corporate control.
See, e.g. , Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Institutional Shareholder
Activism and Related Proposals for Legislative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate
Governance Rules, 696 PLI/Corp 621 (PLI June 21, 1990) available in DIALOG
(describing different types and degrees of institutional activism through use of recent
examples). In addition, the threat or exercise of disciplinary measures, ranging from a
full-scale proxy contest to initiation of derivative litigation, may be properly viewed as
methods of monitoring management. Distinction between monitoring activities is
important because different types of monitoring involve vastly different costs, present
different types of risks to an investor, and presumably differ in their effectiveness in
enhancing corporate performance.
24 See, e. g., Dent, supra note 4, at 907-23 (discussing benefits of returning
control of corporations to shareholders); cf. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259 (1967) (explaining that public
corporation is designed to separate ownership from management, thereby facilitating
specialization).
25 These mechanisms include the right of a shareholder under state corporation
law to inspect corporate books and records, the shareholder's right to corporate
information under the federal securities laws, the ability to replace directors and
initiate changes in corporate governance through the voting process, and the use of
derivative litigation to correct wrongdoing or recover damages.
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monitoring requires the activist shareholder to spend money. 26 It will be
rational for an investor to spend funds to monitor only when the expected
returns generated by monitoring exceed its costs . In mathematical terms, 27
if r(m) is the return from monitoring activity m, and C(m) is the cost of
monitoring, 28 the investor will monitor only when r(m) - C(m) > 0.
The traditional explanation for the failure of shareholder monitoring to
produce efficiently run corporations is a collective action problem . The
growth of large public corporations and the development of a national
securities market have led to an investment norm in which investors tend to
diversify, that is, to own a small quantity of stock in a large number of
companies . From the perspective of an individual investor, diversification
can be justified by a variety of factors, including the reduction of risk.
Diversified investors are less l ikely to encounter situations in which it is
rational to expend funds to monitor their investments. This is because,
while the return to an investor is a function of the quantity of stock owned,
monitoring costs are l argely unrelated to the size of the investment.
Accordingly, if an investor has only a small stake in a company, the
effect of monitoring will have to be enormous to yield the investor a
sufficiently large return to justify the expense. 29 This causes shareholders
to forgo monitoring activities that would benet1t them as a group , because
26 See, e.g. , Lucian A . Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820,
1837 (1989) (describing costs associated with effective shareholder monitoring through
the voting process as including the investment in the acquisition and processing of
information necessary to evaluate the merits of the voting decision); Coffee, supra
note 10, at 1339 n.235 (describing current cost of conducting a proxy campaign in
opposition to management at between $2 million and $15 million, depending upon the
size of the corporation and the specific proposal). Monitoring entails a variety of
indirect costs as well, including, for example, the risk of business reprisals for
opposing corporate management. /d.
27 Although the mathematical model is of limited utility in explaining this simple
preliminary concept, it is introduced here as a basis for subsequent development.
28 Costs are expressed as a function of m because the cost of monitoring varies
with the nature of the particular form of monitoring. For example, the cost associated
with the intelligent exercise of the corporate franchise is considerably less than the
cost of mounting a full-scale proxy contest.
29 Small individual stakes make shareholder apathy rational because many
monitoring activities, if conducted by small investors, will not affect corporate
decisionmaking. For example, Professor Dent describes this "rational apathy" by
institutional investors in connection with proxy voting by explaining that, if a
shareholder cannot affect the outcome of a vote, a rational level of investment in
voting is zero. See Dent, supra note 4, at 903.
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n o single shareholder can justify the cost of monitoring.30 Because the
problem can be attributed to the inability of a large dispersed shareholder
body to apportion the costs of monitoring within the collective group , it is
described as a collective action problem.3 1
In mathematical terms, we can see the effect of shareholder dispersion
and diversification on the monitoring decision as follows. If a corporation
were owned b y a single shareholder, the entire return from monitoring,
which we can designate R(m), would accrue to that shareholder. Thus, in
the single shareholder scenario, R(m) equals r(m), the return to the
shareholder. In a corporation with multiple shareholders, however, no
single investor reaps the entire benefit of monitoring. Instead, returns
accrue to each investor on a pro rata basis, reflecting that investor's
ownership interest in the company. An investor who owns ten percent of
the company , for example, will receive returns of (10%)(R(m)) . If we
designate as k(i) the percentage ownership by the monitoring investor in
company i, we can then distinguish returns to the investor, r(m), from
returns to the group as follows : k(i)R(m) = r(m).
The result is a collective action problem because, although an investor
will monitor only in situations where k(i)R(m) - C(m) > 0, it would be
socially beneficial for monitoring to occur whenever R(m)- C(m) > 0. If it
were possible for shareholders to act collectively and to apportion the costs
on a pro rata basis, monitoring would occur more frequently. Thus
collective action problems explain the failure of investors to engage in the
sociall y optimal level of monitoring activity.
This model can be used to demonstrate why institutional activism
offers the possibility of greater monitoring. Recent years have seen an
overwhelming increase in the amount of stock held by institutional
investors, both in absolute and relative terms . 3 2 Because institutional stakes
3 0 For a numerical illustration of this point, see Coffee, supra note 10, at 128586 n.23.
3 1 The difficulty in apportioning the costs of a collective good among the
beneficiaries of that good is the classic collective action problem. Included in this
concept is the related problem of free-riding, which results from the fact that
beneficiaries of a collective good often cannot be excluded from enj oying the benefit
even if they do not share in the costs of producing the good. For an extended
discussion of the collective action problems presented by dispersed shareholder efforts
to monitor corporate management, see Rock, supra note 2, at 454-63.
32 For example, recent data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve shows that institutions now hold 54.2% of the $4.96 trillion market value of
stock outstanding and that only 45.8% is held by individuals. The greatest relative
increase in shareholdings is by private pension funds, and mutual funds, which
together now own about a third of the outstanding equity. Institutions Hold Dominant
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in corporations are typically larger than those held by individuals,
institutions will monitor more frequently . Institutions can justify spending
money to monitor because the gains that accrue to a large shareholder from
monitoring more often exceed the costs of monitoring .33
Other considerations strengthen this conclusion. It may cost
institutional investors less to monitor due to their greater sophistication and
superior access to information. 34 Because of their size and the quantity of
resources they control , they may also have more influence with corporate
management, making their monitoring activities more effective. The
traditional model suggests that both these factors increase the number of
situations in which the benefits of monitoring will exceed the costs.
This model of institutional monitoring has gathered widespread
support. 35 It has also generated proposals for l egislative reform designed
both to facilitate l arge shareholdings by institutions and to reduce the costs
of activism. 3 6 The most notable response to these proposals has been the
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)'s recent l iberalization of the
federal proxy rules . After two sets of proposed amendments to the proxy
rules and an extensive comment process, the SEC substantially amended
the rules on October 16, 1992. The amendments were made in direct
response to complaints by institutional investors that the proxy rules
Stake in Equities Market, Fed Board Data Show, 25 SEC. REG. & L.REP. 943 (July 9,
1993). The evolution and significance of the institutional investor is fairly new; as
recently as 1965, individuals owned 84% of outstanding stock. !d.
33 See, e.g. , Rock, supra note 2, at 459 (describing how increased
institutionalization of shareholdings will allow shareholders to organize more easily to
overcome collective action problems).
34 One way in which institutions have already explored this process is by pooling
information and monitoring activities through organizations like Institutional
Shareholder Services. Professors Gilson and Kraakman urge an expansion of this
approach, suggesting that institutions can significantly reduce collective action costs by
joining together to support a new class of professional independent directors. Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 3.
35 See, e.g. , Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 3, at 830-49; Alfred F.
Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism ?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 117
(1988); Dent, supra note 4; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3; Vanecko, supra note
3, at 381-82; Black, Beyond Proxy Refonn, supra note 3, at 2.
3 6 See, e.g. , Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Refonn, 18 J. CoRP. L. 1,
49-52 (1992) (suggesting reforms to federal proxy rules to remove obstacles to
institutional shareholder activism); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment
Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSJC in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1010 (1993) (proposing exemptions from
Investment Company Act of 1940 to allow development of Managerial Strategic
Investment Companies to engage in monitoring of publicly held corporations).
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prevented them from communicating with one another and participating
effectively in corporate governance.37 Among other things, the
amendments eliminated the requirement that shareholders who actively
participate in the proxy solicitation process report their participation to the
SEC.3 8 According to the SEC, the amendments were " intended to facilitate
shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to
reduce the cost of compliance for all persons engaged in a proxy
solicitation. "39
III. RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR:
THE COMPLICATION OF COMPETITION

The foregoing analysis suggests that institutional investing is likely to
provide a response to the collective action problem because it allows
investors to overcome the cost barrier to active investing. This analysis has
led many to predict an increase in relationship investing. This section
suggests that, in spite of the advent of increased numbers of institutional
investors with large ownership stakes, there is unlikely to be a revolution
in corporate governance. Rather, the mathematical model, as described
above, is deficient. It overstates the l ikelihood that institutional investors
will expend significant resources on monitoring because it fails to capture
accurately the rational decisionmaking process of some institutional
investors .
The central flaw with the model is that it assumes institutional
investors seek to maximize absolute returns in making investment
37 Indeed, the comprehensive reexamination of federal proxy regulation, which
culminated in the proxy rule amendments, was initiated by a series of letters to the
SEC from some of the most activist institutional investors. See Letter from Richard H.
Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of
Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3 , 1989), reprinted
in INSTITlTfiONAL INvESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTMST OWNERS, at 454-76
(199 0); Letter from United Shareholders' Association to Edward H. Fleischman,
Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 20, 199 0) reprinted in
INSTITlTfiONAL INvESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTMST OWNERS, at 485 (199 0).
3 8 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 3 1,326 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,051 (Oct.
16, 1992). For a description of the changes in proxy regulation effected by this
release, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Recon structing Proxy Regulation,
46 VAND. L. REv. 1129 , 1165-70 (1993).
39 Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 3 0, 849 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85, 002 (June 24,
1992).
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decisions . For many institutional investors, however, this assumption is not
accurate. Many institutions are driven by competitive forces . Their
performance is evaluated not in absolute terms , but based on whether they
are able to generate a higher rate of return than the competition or than the
market. 40 It may be better, in terms of competitive advantage and thus the
ability to command future commitments of resources , for a firm to beat its
competitors than to show some steady rate of return, even if absolute
returns in each year are thereby reduced . 41
Although successful relationship investing may increase net present
value, it leaves comparative performance unchanged. When i nvestors
decide whether to commit resources, they are more concerned with whether
an institution performed better than others than with the return realized by
the institution. If relationship investing does not create a competitive
advantage, an institution has l ittle incentive to engage in it, even if it
creates net present value.
The focus on beating competitors operates at two levels . F irst, some
institutional investors are evaluated-by customers, the market for their
products, etc.-on the basis of their return relative to their competitors. A
mutual fund presents the classic example of this phenomenon . Mutual
funds are evaluated almost exclusively on the basis of their relative total

40 Mutual funds, for example, frequently advertise their performance in various
fund rankings which assess performance on a competitive basis. This practice has
recently led the National Association of Securities Dealers to issue guidelines for the
use of such rankings in advertisements. See, e.g. , NASD Hopes to Have Guidelines for
Mutual Fund Ranldngs in Place Shortly, 26 Sec . Reg. L. Rep . 664-65 (May 6, 1994).
4 1 The degree to which the search for competitive advantage influences
investment patterns is substantial. Because the efficient capital market hypothesis
explains that, over the long run, stock-picking techniques are unable systematically to
outperform the market, and because stock trading generates greater transaction costs
than an index-based buy and hold strategy, it appears irrational for institutional
investors to engage in active trading strategies. See, e.g. , Lynn Stout, Are Stock
Markets Costly Casinos ? Disagreement, Market Failure and Securities Regulation, VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (describing stock trading as a negative sum game
resulting from market failure). Nonetheless, the proliferation of mutual funds and
other institutions that persist in active trading suggests that the effort to beat rather
than simply mirror market rates of return remains considerable. Moreover, the
practitioner literature suggests that active selection can be profitable. See Darryll
Hendricks et al. , Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-Run Persistence of Relative
Peifonnance, 1974-1988, 48 J. FIN. 93 (1993) (recounting prevalence of stock
picking activity among mutual funds and evaluations of such funds based on relative
performance).
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return. 42 Individual investors may be concerned about mutual fund return
in absolute terms in deciding whether to invest at all, but in choosing
which fund, they focus on criteria such as a firm ranking near the top of its
category or beating the relevant market indicators . Indeed, the relative
performance of mutual funds is compiled on a regular basis, and many
investors base their choice of mutual funds on a fund's relative
performance. 43
The same premise is used to evaluate the performance of the
individuals who make decisions on behalf of an institutional investor. A
mutual fund manager may be evaluated directly on the basis of whether the
fund outperformed comparable funds, or indirectly on the extent to which
the fund attracted customer investment. Even if managers are compensated
based on the volume of money attracted rather than the profitability of the
fund, the ability of customers to shift their assets continually to top
performing funds will cause the rational fund manager to strive for short
term superior relative performance. 44
Other types of institutional investors are also susceptible to concerns
about relative performance. Although the investor itself, such as a pension
fund, may have no need to evaluate its returns on a relative basis, those
who manage the investments of that institution may be judged by their
performance relative to the market. For example, a public pension fund
may have no need to beat market indicators in order to win
investors/beneficiaries . If, however, the manager of that fund consistently
achieves returns that are lower than relevant market indicators, he or she is
likely to be replaced. Thus , in terms of the individual investment decisions,
the manager is again influenced by considerations of relative return.
Thus , many rational institutions will make investment decisions not
with the goal of maximizing absolute return but rather of maximizing
return relative to market indicators or other firms in the industry. This
concern for competitive success creates a problem with activism. If an
investor improves corporate performance by monitoring, it increases
42 See Hendricks et al., supra note 41 (describing evaluation of mutual funds
based on performance).
43 See, e.g. , id. at 94 ("investors steer their money to funds that have performed
well recently [relative to the competition]"). Indeed, customers can and do shift their
money from fund to fund in response to reports of relative performance. This steers a
larger quantity of assets to those managers who have performed well in the recent
past.
44 See id. ; see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 1319 (describing continual ability of
investors to shift their funds from one mutual fund to another, with little notice, in
search of the fund able to outperform its competitors).
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returns to all other investors in the target company. This is the typical free
rider problem with respect to those other investors who benefit from the
fund's monitoring activity at no cost. But the problem goes beyond the
collective action problem.
An institution that invests monitoring resources in order to increase
return will benefit less than its competitors because its total return is
tempered by the expenditure of the costs of monitoring. Therefore, on a
percentage basis, monitoring increases returns to the monitoring institution
less than to passive investors and the market as a whole. By monitoring,
the firm directly reduces its rate of return relative to other i nvestors .
Monitoring by a firm or an individual investment advisor that is judged o n
the basis of relative returns therefore may not b e a rational economic
choice.
It is important to remember that spending money to monitor is
primarily logical for those investors who seek to exceed market rates of
return. If an investor can meet its investment objectives by duplicating the
market rate of return, it can minimize both costs and risks through an
appropriately diversified passive investment strategy such as indexing.45
Accordingly, monitoring only makes sense as an effort to outperform the
market. The question is whether, in the case of investors who are judged
on a relative basis, monitoring can be a rational choice.
We must adj ust the mathematical model of monitoring, as used above,
to address this question, because that model is based on the premise that
investors seek to maximize absolute rather than relative returns . In other
words , the model assumes that an investor will monitor whenever a dollar
invested in monitoring generates a return of more than a dollar, net of
costs . By considering relative return, we have observed that this
assumption is too simplistic. It may not be rational for an investor to
undertake activities that net a positive return, if the return to non
monitoring shareholders is greater. An investor judged on a relative basis
is disadvantaged by undertaking monitoring activities that yield greater net
returns to its competitors .46
45 Thus Professor Coffee's concerns about exit, see infra note 56, carry more
weight than he realized because monitoring requires investors to give up
diversification in favor of stock-picking, to give up liquidity in favor of voice, and, as
a result, to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage with their counterparts who
index.
46 The same is true with respect to the overall market rate of return. Professors
Gilson and Kraakman make the argument that institutional investors will be best
served by seeking system-wide improvements to the corporate governance structure
that will increase market rates of return. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3. Such
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In order to consider the effect of competition on the model, it is
necessary to convert the returns generated to percentage terms because
investment performance can only be compared by viewing returns on a
percentage basis. 47 Such conversion involves quantifying the returns
achieved by monitoring in terms of the percentage return generated over an
arbitrary period of time. 48 If we designate the percentage return on an
investment over some period of time as p,, we can calculate p, by dividing
the absolute dollar amount of return by the amount of the investment. If the
total amount of resources invested in investment i is reflected as A (i), then
p,(i) = r(i)IA (i). 49 The investor's investment return, U, on a total portfolio
value of T, where T = I A (i), is, in relative terms, I r(i)IT. Put
differently, the overall return is the weighted average of the investor's
returns on individual investments, U = (IJ.J(i)A (i))II A (i).
Thus the effect of monitoring on overall investment returns is directly
related to the degree to which the investor's portfolio is concentrated in the
subject corporation. Increasing the return on an individual investment in
the portfolio through monitoring will have a progressively greater impact
on the investor's overall investment returns to the extent that an increasing
proportion of the investor's portfolio is devoted to that investment. In other
words, monitoring is more effective, in terms of increasing portfolio
returns on a percentage basis, when the monitored company represents a
large portion of the monitoring investor's portfolio .
Recall , however, that the return to the monitoring investor must also
reflect the costs of monitoring. This cost is not shared by other
shareholders . Therefore the improvement on a percentage yield basis of an
investment's performance, based on monitoring activity, is always going to
be less for the monitoring investor than for nonmonitoring shareholders . If
monitoring increases performance by ten percent, the monitoring
improvements, however, will not improve any single investor's competitive position
relative to the industry as a whole and are therefore unlikely objectives of investors
subject to evaluation on relative terms.
47 It is meaningless to try to evaluate an investment on the ground that it
generates a return of $10. The implicit question is the amount of return in relationship
to the investment size. Thus a $10 return on a $10 investment is a return of 100%, a
very good return, while a $10 return on a $100,000 investment is a return of .01 %, a
very poor rate.
48 The relevant time period need not be specified for purposes of this analysis but
could, for example, be the period of time over which an investor was evaluating the
effect of its monitoring activity on performance. Obviously some time component is a
necessary predicate for this evaluation-a 5% rate of return per month is significantly
better than a rate of 5% per year.
49 The reader will recall that r(i) is the return on investment i, in absolute terms .
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shareholder always captures some return less than ten percent, because its
return, and only its return, is reduced by the cost of monitoring.
Monitoring, therefore, diminishes the institutional investor's returns
relative to the market as a whole. Does this mean that a rational investor
interested in relative returns will never monitor because that investor's
returns will be improved by less than those of its competitors? The answer
is no . The effect of monitoring on overall portfolio performance, as we
saw above, is a function of two things : the increase in relative returns on
that investment and the concentration of the investor's portfol io invested in
the target company relative to the concentration of its competitors. We can
reflect the investor's excess concentration in investment i, that is, the
degree to which its portfolio concentration exceeds the concentration of its
competitors , by A (i)IT - M(i)!Z where M(i) is th� total amount of resources
invested in investment i by competitor institutions and Z is the total
investment of competitor institutions . 50 Thus if ;.l (i) is the excess profit
generated by monitoring investment i, the rational investor will monitor
whenever p' (i) (A (i)IT - M(i)!Z) - C(m) > 0.
In order for this formula to be satisfied, the monitoring shareholder
must concentrate its portfolio substantially. If an investor effects profitable
monitoring in a company in which it owns, proportionately, a l arger stake
than its competitors, the effect on its performance, relative to the effect on
the performance of competitors, will be larger. Thus, in that case, and only
in that case, will the investor improve its relative position.
Portfolio theory tells us that concentration subjects an investor to a
large amount of unsystematic or alpha risk-the risk that results from firm
specific variables . 5 1 Because this risk can be eliminated through
diversification,52 it is an uncompensated risk; that is, unlike beta risk, the
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50 M(i)!Z reflects the overall percentage of competitor resources concentrated in
investment i or target company i. We might similarly evaluate an investor's
concentration relative to the market as a whole. A benchmark for market
concentration would be the percentage of a value-weighted market index, such as the
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, represented by company i.
5 1 The classic works on the relationship between risk and return and the ability to
eliminate unsystematic risk through diversification are Franco Modigliani and Gerald
A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence (pts. 1 & 2) , 30
FIN. ANALYSTS J. , Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 68 (pt. 1), May-June 1 974, at 69 (pt. 2).
52 Indeed, most institutions hold broadly diversified portfolios for the explicit
purpose of eliminating all unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk, or unique risk, is that
part of total risk that is unique to a company or industry; it can therefore be eliminated
by diversification. See, e.g. , RICHARD A . BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 136-3 8 (4th ed . 1 99 1) (explaining how
diversification eliminates unsystematic risk) ; BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDoM WALK
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market does not provide a superior return for investors who choose to bear
alpha risk . Accordingly, concentration creates an additional cost for
investors .53 Because firm-specific risk is a function of the degree of
concentration, 54 we can represent it as an additional cost in the
mathematical model : a(A (i)IT) . Our mathematical model now indicates that
the rational investor will monitor if J.l '(i) (A (i}IT - M(i)!Z) C(m) - a(A (i)IT)
> 0.
-

IV . RETHINKING THE PROMISE OF RELATIONSHIP INVESTING
A.

Further Thoughts on the Likelihood ofActivism

The foregoing model suggests that, for most rational institutional
investors, the benefits of active monitoring do not outweigh the costs . A
number of skeptics have suggested additional explanations why relationship
investing is unlikely to reform corporate governance. 55 Although a detailed
analysis of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, several
scholars have criticized the traditional analysis of monitoring as
understating the costs of institutional activism. These scholars argue that
the costs of monitoring include both direct and indirect costs . The indirect
costs include a loss of l iquidity, 5 6 costs of legal rules designed to constrain
DoWN WALL

STREET 223-27 (5th ed. 1 990) (same) ; see also W.H. Wagner & S.C.
Lau, The Effect of Diversification on Risk, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. Nov.-Dec. 1 97 1 , at
48.
53 To the degree that concentration increases the size of the average investment
position, it also decreases liquidity, which creates additional cost. See, e.g. , Coffee,
supra note 10, at 1288 (stating that investors face substantial price discounts in trying
to sell large blocks of stock) ; Ira M. Millstein, On the Making of Pension Funds as
"Patient Capitalists ", DIREcrORS & BOARDS, Winter 1990, at 1 1 , 15 (explaining that
large blocks of stock create liquidity problems for pension funds) .
54 The function is exponential rather than linear. Accordingly, small amounts of
diversification can greatly reduce an investor's alpha risk.
55 Articles expressing skepticism about the likelihood or value of institutional
monitoring include Coffee, supra note 10; Edward B . Rock, Controlling the Dark Side
of Relational Investing, 1 5 C ARDOzo L. REv. 9 87 ( 1994) [hereinafter Rock,
Controlling the Dark Side] ; Rock, supra note 2; Roe, supra note 14; Romano, supra
note 1 3 .
5 6 In his classic piece o n the subject, Professor Coffee explains that an investor's
choice to exercise control reduces the liquidity of the investor's holdings. Coffee,
supra note 10. Thus an investor is faced with a choice of whether to exercise greater
voice through monitoring activities or to retain the maximum amount of liquidity
possible. See, e.g. , id. at 1287 (" [A]ny attempt by institutional investors in the United
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institutional activism, 57 risk of management retaliation, 5 8 and public

States to exercise control over corporate managements will entail a probable sacrifice
of this liquidity, which may be an unacceptable cost to them. ") ; id. at 1 3 1 8-28
(discussing various structural constraints that force institutional investors to choose
between "exit" and "voice") . Many institutional investors are unable, because of their
structure, to accept diminished liquidity. For example, open end mutual funds must
stand ready to liquidate holdings at any time in order to meet customer redemption
requests. /d. at 1 3 1 8 . Even for investors who can accept less liquidity, the reduction
represents an additional cost of monitoring. Indeed, Professor Coffee concludes that
the costs of monitoring make it unlikely that investors will voluntarily increase their
monitoring activities at the expense of liquidity and offers, as an alternative
explanation for recent increases in shareholder activism , the suggestion that some
institutions have already sacrificed liquidity by virtue of the size or nature of their
shareholdings. /d. at 1288-89. For those investors, because exit is no longer an
option, monitoring does not impose this additional cost.
57 Legal rules can restrict institutional monitoring in two ways. First, legal rules
of general application can limit the role of shareholders in corporate decisionmaking
or the ability of shareholders to act collectively. An example of the former is the
regulation of shareholder voting under the federal proxy rules. Although , as described
above, the federal proxy regulations were recently amended to facilitate institutional
activism , the rules continue to limit the ability of shareholders to affect corporate
decisionmaking. For example, the SEC 's application of Rule 14a-8 has limited the
ability of institutional investors to propose policy changes through the shareholder
proposal process; the SEC has determined that many such proposals are not proper
matters for shareholder action because they relate to the ordinary business operations
of the corporation. See Fisch, supra note 3 8 , at 1 1 55-62 (discussing SEC 's application
of the exclusion for proposals relating to ordinary business operations). Similarly the
proxy rules require institutions that wish to propose candidates for board positions to
conduct a separate proxy solicitation, thereby increasing the costs of challenging
management control of the nomination process. See id. at 1 162-65 (discussing
restrictions imposed by federal proxy regulation on direct nomination of directors by
shareholders) ; see also Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 4, at 1073 {describing how state
law rules on reimbursement of proxy contest expenses favor management over
stockholder/challengers and obstruct socially beneficial challenges) .
The reporting requirements under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act have
also been criticized as a constraint on institutional activism . The statute and the SEC
rules thereunder apply to persons who purchase or decide to hold as a group more
than five percent of a corporation's shares and require such persons to disclose their
identity and intentions. Because the regulations define as a group , for disclosure
purposes, investors who decide to act jointly with respect to voting their securities or
otherwise influencing the control of the corporation, the filing requirement applies to
efforts by investors to engage in collective action. In addition to actual filing, the
requirement has been viewed as a burden on shareholder activism because it provides
notice to the corporation of potentially hostile group action by shareholders and
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because of the possibility that the corporation will respond with litigation. A related
analysis suggests that it is possible to apply "controlling person" liability under the
federal securities laws to institutional investors who actively monitor. See Conard,
supra note 35.
Second, legal rules can regulate the investment activity of particular types of
institutional investors by requiring a certain degree of diversification which limits the
ability of an investor to invest on a concentrated basis, requiring that the investor limit
its activity to passive investments, or both. Federal banking laws, for example,
prevent banks from acquiring large blocks of corporate stock and explicitly require
passivity with respect to these investments. Banks are prohibited by law from owning
stock directly, although bank holding companies are permitted to own up to five
percent of the voting shares of a nonbank. See, e.g. , Banking Act of 1933 (Glass
Steagall), § 5(c), 12 U.S .C. § 335 (1 988) . For a more detailed discussion of legal
limitations on equity ownership and participation by banks , see Aleta G. Estreicher,
Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L.
REv. 5 1 3 , 567-68 (1993); Mark J. Roe , Some Differences in Corporate Structure in
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe,
Di.fferences] .
The Investment Company Act of 1 940 imposes similar limitations on
concentration and activism on mutual funds. Commentators have explained that
similar restrictions may be imposed on other types of institutional investors by
insurance regulations, ERISA, state pension regulations or antitrust law. See, e.g. ,
Estreicher, supra, at 590-91 (describing legal limitations imposed by insurance
regulations and Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act) ; Romano, supra note
1 3 , at 800 (describing state law limits on percentage ownership by public pension
funds of company's outstanding stock); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990); Helen Garten, Institutional
Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 585, 6 13-20 (1992);
Mark J. Roe , A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1 COLUM. L. REv.
10 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory] . For example, in many states common
stock holdings are completely ignored for the purpose of determining if an insurance
company has sufficient capital to satisfy regulatory requirements. See, e.g. , N.Y. INs.
LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1985) ; CAL. INs. CODE § 1 170 (West 1993).
5 8 See Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Active Investing in the U.S. Equity Market:
Past Performance and Future Prospects, Report for the California Public Employees'
Retirement System, 39-43 (Jan. 1 1 , 1993) [hereinafter Gordon Group Study]
(identifying risks of defeat and management retaliation associated with nonnegotiated
or hostile activism). Certain types of institutions have traditionally seen themselves as
affiliated with management and management's interests. Private pension funds serve as
the primary example of this phenomenon; because pension fund managers owe their
existence and selection to the management of public companies, they have a strong
promanagement loyalty or bias that is difficult to overcome . See, e.g. , Taking the
Offensive, INSTITUTIONAL INvESTOR, Dec. 19 87, at 101 (noting that survey of
corporate pension money managers revealed that only 6 . 8 % claimed to have resisted
advice from corporate pension officers regarding how to vote pension fund proxies) .

1 02 8

OHIO STA TE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5 5 : 1 009

approbation. 5 9
In addition, the structure of the institutional investor itself reflects a
separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs within the
institution. 6 ° In other words, institutional investors have, themselves,
begun to succumb to a corporate mode of operating, in which those who
exercise investment and voting authority are distinct from, and only
Banks and insurance companies operate within similar constraints, in part because they
frequently look to corporate management for other business relationships, which active
monitoring might jeopardize. The structural bias of these relationships suggests that,
although these institutions may be able to engage in negotiated or management
friendly monitoring activities, they are unlikely to undertake activism of a more
hostile or disciplinary nature. See, e.g. , James A. Brickley et al. , Ownership Structure
and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J . FIN. ECON. 267 (1988) (demonstrating
that institutional investors that have additional business relationships with target
companies are more likely to support management-sponsored proposals) . Even those
institutions that appear structurally resistant to management pressure are reluctant to
challenge management. See Diana B . Henriques, Fidelity 's Secret Agent Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1 99 1 , § 3 , at 1 (describing efforts by the Fidelity group of mutual
funds to maintain reputation as friendly long-term investors); see also Robert C .
Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb .
1994, at 140 (suggesting that the threat of litigation by a portfolio company imposes a
substantial and unpredictable cost on activism) .
5 9 The best example of public resistance to institutional activism is the response to
the takeover environment of the 1980s, in which institutional investors were portrayed
as destructive, greedy, and concerned exclusively with short-term gains, and a variety
of legal reforms were proposed to prevent Wall Street from destroying the U . S .
corporation through activism . See, e.g. , Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 5 8 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 87, 205- 13 (199 1) (proposing to eliminate hostile tender offers and
limit director elections to once every five years to address problems caused by
increasing institutional activism and short-termism) . Moreover, the very institutions
typically viewed as likely activists because of their freedom from management
loyalties may be constrained by the adverse reaction of their "other constituencies" to
activism. For example, Professor Barnard relates the conflict and political fallout
created when the State of Wisconsin Investment Board submitted a management
critical shareholder proposal to General Motors at a time when General Motors was
considering expanding operations and providing additional jobs in Wisconsin. Jayne
W. Barnard , Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N . C . L.
REv. 1 135, 1 14 1 n.39 (1991). For an extensive discussion of the political constraints
on activism by public pension funds, see Romano , supra note 13 .
60 See Institutional Investors and Corporate America: Conflicts and Resolutions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 1 0 1 st Cong . , 1 st Sess. 2-3 (Oct. 3 , 1989) (prepared by Carolyn
Kay Brancato at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities) .
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marginally accountable to , the beneficiaries . 6 1 Indeed , it is l ikely that
agency costs are greater for institutional investors than for corporations
because many of the structures designed to provide accountabil ity at the
corporate level-such
and

the possibility of beneficiary exit, the discipline of

provided
shareholder voting power-are absent in most institutional structures . 6 2

proxy

contests

as

takeover

battles,

and

the

checks

by

Thus, in the view of the skeptics , activist monitoring by institutional
investors is even less l ikely to occur. This conclusion is supported by
examining the recent evidence of institutional activism. Although both the
popular and academic press have lauded the rise in active participation by
institutional shareholders and proclaimed the "big impact" of relationship
investing on the " running of American business, "63 reports of shareholder
monitoring may be overstated .64
First, institutions are, for the most part, taking only the small step of
deciding to read proxy statements and to exercise the right to vote. 65
6 1 Professor Coffee cites public pension funds as an example of institutional

investors that are particularly unaccountable to their beneficiaries because of their
size, organizational structure, and the dispersion of their beneficiaries. See Coffee,
supra note 10, at 1335-36; see also Rock, supra note 2, at 452 (explaining that
increasing concentration of shareholding raises problems of increased agency costs
within the institutional investor).
62 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 1283 n.21 (describing various reasons why
agency costs will be higher at the institutional investor level than within the corporate
management structure).
The creation of shareholder advisory committees, a monitoring tool that has
received recent attention, creates yet another layer of agency costs by placing an
additional set of agents between the institutional investors and the boards of portfolio
companies. See Barnard, supra note 59, at 1 166-67.
6 3 Dickson, supra note 6 .
6 4 For example, there has been widespread reporting o f institutional activism at
A&P and Paramount. A&P is 53 % owned by a German retailing group , however,
making protests by institutional investors somewhat futile. Moreover, in spite of some
furor about Paramount's executive pay policy, led by Wisconsin's public pension
fund, the Paramount directors were re-elected with more than 9 8 % of the vote cast.
/d.
6S Further attention to and exercise of voting rights is clearly one area in which
institutional investors have become more active, both in the United States and abroad.
See, e.g. , James Kim, Campbell Puts Heat on Other Companies, USA TODAY, July
16, 1993 , at B 1 (describing decision by Campbell Soup Company and a small group of
other private corporate pension funds to exercise their proxy voting power critically
with respect to issues of corporate governance) ; John Plender, Survey of Pension Fund
Investment, FIN. TIMES , May 6 , 1993, at VII (describing evolution from system in
which four out of five pension fund managers did not exercise their voting rights as a
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Although more frequent and critical66 voting by institutional investors may
affect management decisions indirectly, its primary effect is likely to be
limited to rejecting antitakeover provisions and supporting precatory
shareholder proposals that advocate more responsible exercise of
management power. 6 7 These activities do not naturally lead toward the
model of relationship investing in which management and institutions work
hand in hand to forge corporate policy. Nor do they promise increased
disciplining of management beyond the highly publicized takeover arena.
Voting, even in opposition to management' s recommendations, is unlikely
to effect substantial changes in management behavior. 68
Second, few institutional investors appear to be going further. 6 9 To the
extent that monitoring involves the use of more activist efforts to influence
corporate policy, institutions do not appear convinced that the game is
worth the candle. 70 Pension funds are reportedly l eery of the risks
matter of course to system in which the Cadbury report recommends positive use of
voting rights by institutional investors); Leslie Wayne, Seeking Investment with
Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1 993 , at D 1 (describing "Avon letter" issued by
Department of Labor in 1988, which described corporate proxies as a pension plan
asset that plan managers were required to take seriously) .
66 There are extensive press reports of efforts by institutional shareholder
organizations to disseminate information designed to motivate active shareholdership .
See, e.g. , Martin Dickson, 'Poor performers ' List Gives Ammunition to Institutions,
FIN. TIMES , Oct. 8 , 1 993 , at 25 (describing list prepared by Council of Institutional
Investors identifying the poorest performing companies in America) . Beyond
generating publicity , however, it is not clear that institutions are making much use of
this information.
6 7 See, e.g. , American Corporate Governance,· Shareholders Call the Plays,
ECONOMIST , Apr. 24, 1993 , at 83 (describing increase in efforts by institutions to
reform corporate governance through proxy voting and informal negotiations and
listing targeted changes as including removal of staggered boards, golden handcuffs
and poison pills) ; Dean Foust, Who 's in Charge Here ?, Bus. WK. , Mar. 1 9 , 1 990, at
3 8-39 (describing institutional activism with respect to shareholder proposals on
poison pills, golden parachutes and staggered boards) .
68 This situation is aggravated by the legal and institutional limitations on the
effectiveness of shareholder voting. Even under a campaign in which institutions
overwhelmingly vote in opposition to management's slate of directors, for example, in
the absence of a competing slate , the directors will nonetheless be elected . q: Joseph
A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside
the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993).
6 9 See Gordon Group Study, supra note 58, at 44 ("One difficulty in measuring
the value effects of [relationship investing] is that remarkably little of it has in fact
occurred to date in the U.S. market. ") .
7 0 See, e.g. , Meaningful Relationships, EcoNOMIST, June 26, 1 993 , at 8 2
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associated with relationship investing,7 1 and institutions that engage in
stock-picking investment strategies also appear skeptical . 72
Indeed, it is possible to explain the rapid growth in institutional
2-·.::tivism as simply a second order institutional response to the takeover era.
Institutional activism was first observed in the context of corporate control
transactions, in which institutions were criticized for their short-term
orientation.73 Takeovers were defended , however, as the means by which
the stock market monitored corporate management: inefficient management
caused declining stock prices that would create a takeover opportunity. 74
The combination of state antitakeover statutes and court-sanctioned
antitakeover devices substantially contributed to the decline of takeovers in
the late 1980s . The rise in "institutional participation in corporate
governance directly coincides with this decline. 75 The correlation is clear.
To the extent that takeovers provided a check on management inefficiency,
the advent of these defensive measures should have operated to depress
stock prices artificially .76 Accordingly, it would be rational for institutions
(questioning whether relationship investing may be too risky for institutional
investors) .
7l A study of the value of shareholder activism conducted by the Gordon Group
on behalf of CalPERS concluded that although active investments had the potential to
generate superior returns, they presented a variety of risks for an investor like
CalPERS, many of which risks could not readily be quantified . Gordon Group Study,
supra note 5 8 .
72 American Corporate Governance; Shareholders Call the Plays, supra note 67,
at 83 .
73 See, e.g. , The Impact of Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance,
Takeovers and the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong. , 1st Sess. 228
(Oct. 3 , 1989) (statement of Sen. Terry Sanford) (stating that concentration of stock in
the hands of institutional investors with short-term focus was "a major cause of the
rampant wave of hostile, highly leveraged transactions that we have seen sweep across
the country in the past 10 years"); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 59 , at 205- 1 3 .
74 See, e.g. , Frank H . Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel , The Proper Role of a
Target 's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1 16 1 ,
1 1 87-8 8 (1981); Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 8 1 9 , 84 1 (1981); Henry
Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL . EcoN. 1 10 (1965).
75 See Barnard, supra note 59, at 1 152-53 (describing development of
institutional activism in late 1 980s).
76 The empirical evidence is mixed but suggests that many antitakeover statutes
and other devices are associated with reductions in stock price and/or corporate value.
See, e.g. , W. Thomas Connor, Note , Sword or Shield: The Impact of Third
Generation State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder Wealth , 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
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to focus their efforts on removing impediments to socially beneficial
takeovers, 77 both because removal would increase stock prices and because
restoring the market's monitoring function would obviate the need for more
·
extensive direct monitoring efforts by investors .7 8 Thus, activism in the
area of takeovers may be a special case79 and may even be consistent with
diminished rather than increased institutional interest in activism . 80
958, 984 (1989) (finding "substantial evidence that [these] third-generation control
share acquisition acts . . . have adversely affected shareholder wealth "); Gregg Jarrell
& Annette Poulsen , Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover
Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. EcoN. 127 (1987) (correlating abnormal negative
returns with supermajority amendments and relating more harmful amendments to
corporations with a lower percentage of institutional ownership); S . Linn & J .
McConnell , A n Empirical Investigation of "Antitakeover" Amendments o n Common
Stock Prices, 1 1 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 6 1 , 3 89-9 1 (1 983) (finding inconclusive effect on
stock price); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr. , Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile
Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis . L. REv. 49 1 , 493-500 (summarizing a
variety of empirical studies) . For summaries of the debate, see also ROMANO, supra
note 1 9 , at 60-72; Bernard S . Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 9 1 1-12 (1992) .
77 See Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the
U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner 's Perspective, 1 992 COLUM. Bus .
L. REV. 223 , 233-34 (describing . topics addressed b y most recent institutional
shareholder i nitiatives as including "rescissions of poison pills, implementation of
confidential voting procedures, reduction in golden parachutes, installation of anti
greenmail provisions, review of executive compensation , opting out of state takeover
statutes, repealing classified boards of directors . . . . ") (footnote omitted) ; Rosenbaum
& Korens, supra note 23 (describing most common institutional investor sponsored
shareholder proposals and related efforts addressing greenmail, antitakeover statutes,
poison pills, and confidential voting); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,
Markets and Courts, 9 1 COLUM. L. REv. 193 1 , 1971 n . l48 (199 1) (describing how, in
response to intense lobbying by institutional investors, Pennsylvania modified
"draconian" antitakeover statute and maj ority of large publicly traded companies
opted out of one or more statutory provisions) ; see also supra note 67.
7 8 But see Rock, supra note 2, at 487 n . 1 64 (citing E. FLAX, VOTING BY
INSTITUTIONAL INvESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUESTIONS IN THE 1985
PROXY SEASON 1 (1985)) (finding limited success by institutions in defeating
antitakeover proposals; in study of more than 450 antitakeover charter amendment
proposals, only 19 were defeated) .
79 The United Shareholders Association has focused its agenda regarding
shareholder activism directly on removing antitakeover provisions that impede market
discipline of corporate governance. Robert Weisman, Shareholders ' Group Takes Aim
at Anti-Takeover Provisions, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 7, 199 1 , at 3 .
80 See, e.g. , Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound , Information, Ownership Structure,
and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance
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Moreover, even the forerunners in the area of institutional activism
appear to be reducing their efforts . CalPERS , probably the most visibly
active institutional investor, dramatically reduced the number of
shareholder initiatives it sponsored during the last proxy season. Recently
it announced a decision not to invest in the LENS fund, a fund organized
by Robert Monks for the purpose of employing active investing
techniques. 8 I This decision came as a major setback to Monks, who had
called CalPERS the "best prospect [he] had in a world where new ideas are
difficult to sel l . " 82 According to another recent report, John Biggs,
chairman of TIAA-CREF, one of the country' s largest institutional
investors, which had participated in a number of efforts to pressure
managers to reorganize their businesses, has stated that he is not interested
in seeking further "high-profile examples of muscle flexing. " 8 3
The promotion of activism has led to the development of a small group
of specialist funds, however, which seek superior returns through self
conscious activism. 84 The investment plans of these funds include
concentrating investment in a limited number of companies and using
Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993) (finding empirical evidence of higher institutional
support for shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills and relax supermajority
requirements and characterizing such support ·as a response to state law and
management action to reduce shareholder rights in the takeover context over the past
decade).
8 1 See Meaningful Relationships, supra note 70 (describing decision by CalPERS
not to invest in LENS fund). For a more detailed description of the LENS fund and
similar funds, see infra note 84 .
82 Susan Pulliam , Calpers Won 't Invest in Activist 's Fund, WALL ST. J . , June 22,
1 993 , at C l . According to a press report in June, Richard Monks pitched the LENS
fund to more than 60 pension funds, but all rejected the opportunity to participate in
relationship investing. Leslie Wayne, Money Manager 's 'Reality Check ', N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1 993 , at D l . The article suggests that competing relationship investing funds
are having similar fundraising problems. Id.
83 Michael Quint, Teachers ' Pension Fund Asks for Diverse Boards, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1993 , at D6 .
84 The funds include the LENS fund, managed b y Robert Monks; Corporate
Partners, an investment fund managed by Lazard Freres; Allied Investment Partners,
sponsored by Dillon Read; and the 1 8 1 8 Fund , sponsored by Brown Brothers
Harriman. See, e.g. , Wayne , supra note 82 (describing size, sponsorship , and
investment objectives of the four funds). The funds offer the opportunity for larger
institutions to invest in activism indirectly by committing resources as passive
investors in the funds. See, e.g. , Allen R. Myerson, Pension Funds Join in
Turnaround Venture, N.Y. TIMEs , Nov. 2, 1993 , at D l . Of course, engaging in
relationship investing by proxy through the use, by institutions, of an investment in a
specialist fund, creates an additional layer of agency relationships.
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activism to generate improved returns in those companies . 8 5 Because the
funds are concentrated, they meet the criteria of the model for which
monitoring is a rational decision . For these funds, monitoring has a much
greater effect on overall returns than it does for diversified investors . 86
Thus the funds are able to distinguish themselves from competitors. The
distinction can operate, however, in either direction . If the monitoring
improves firm performance, the fund will do exceptionally wel l . If the
monitoring is unsuccessful , or if one of the targets experiences unrelated
problems, the fund's concentration in that company is l ikely to result in a
greatly inferior return.
Do these funds represent the future for institutional investors? And
should legal reforms along the l ines of the amendments to the federal proxy
rules be extended, both to facilitate activism and to encourage institutional
investors to employ specialist funds as investment vehicles? In order to
answer those questions, it is necessary to consider further the value of
institutional monitoring. 8 7
B.

The Value ofActivism

A second type of criticism questions whether relationship investing is
capable of improving corporate performance. That is, will activism add
value to corporations? The empirical evidence on this subject is l imited . 88

i
•

!

1
i

85 See Gordon Group Study, supra note 58 (describing investment objectives o f
four specialist funds) ; Wayne, supra note 8 2 , at 1 (same); Dobrzynski, supra note 5
(describing three specialist funds and their stated objectives) .
86 A specialist fund typically invests in five to ten portfolio companies. By
contrast, most institutional investors own hundreds of portfolio companies. See, e.g. ,
Dickson, supra note 66 (describing TIAA-CREF as owning stock in 1 500 companies) .
TIAA-CREF's efforts to monitor a single portfolio company, unlike those of a
specialist fund, are therefore likely to have an insubstantial impact on its overall
returns.
87 For example, Professors Gilson and Kraakman suggest an expansion of the
approach of the specialist funds through the use of MSICs. They define an MSIC as a
"publicly-traded financial intermediary . . . that pursues a core strategy of making
large and active equity investments in a small portfolio of public companies. " Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 36, at 985, 992. Although Gilson and Kraakman advocate
the use of MSICs as an incremental means of achieving the superior monitoring
associated with relationship investing, they acknowledge that the primary concern with
adopting legal reforms to encourage MSICs is the possibility that MSICs would
appropriate value for themselves and would fail to add real value to their portfolio
companies. /d. at 1004.
88 In part, this reflects the difficulty of measuring the effect of monitoring on
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In 1993 , the Gordon Group conducted an extensive study of the monitoring
activities and returns of four activist funds in an effort to determine
whether active investing could provide significantly above-market rates of
return. 8 9 The evidence from the study was largely inconclusive. 90
The study did conclude that there was strong evidence that active
investment strategies were "capable of leading to significant value
increases, "9 1 but it distinguished between negotiated, "friendly, "
transactions and nonnegotiated activism such as proxy initiatives . It found
that the strongest evidence of the value of relationship investing was
presented by nonnegotiated voting initiatives by institutional investors, and
that evidence was "more qualified" on the value effects of friendly
relationship investments . 92
Three of the four funds studied , however, l imit their investments to
friendly negotiated transactions and will not take a position hostile to
existing management. The Gordon Group study identified "mixed value
effects" from friendly relationship investments and hypothesized that the
profitability of these investments may depend in large part on the identity
of the investor. 93
There are obvious reasons for institutions to prefer negotiated
transactions; l imiting participation to negotiated settings eliminates a
number of the downside risks associated with shareholder activism .94 In
particular, friendly transactions are unlikely to generate the political
repercussions associated with hostile monitoring activities . Thus, friendly
transactions are more palatable both in the context of a particular company
corporate performance. Many shareholder initiatives, such as increasing the
percentage of outside directors on corporate boards or linking executive compensation
to corporate returns may be beneficial even if they cannot be directly linked to
changes in stock price. Pozen, supra note 58. Moreover, even when institutional
activism is followed by increased stock price, it is difficult to conclude that the
activism caused the increase. Pozen suggests, for example, that the claimed success of
the LENS fund in pressuring Sears to change its policies did not cause Sears' returns
to differ significantly from the S&P 500 except on the day following the
announcement of a change in policy. /d.
89 Gordon Group Study, supra note 5 8 .
90 An empirical analysis o f the benefits o f monitoring for public pension funds
found that " [l]ittle [could] be concluded concerning the effect of corporate governance
activism on fund performance . " Romano, supra note 1 3 , at 830.
9 1 Gordon Group Study , supra note 58, at 44.
92 /d.
93 /d.
94 See id. at 39-43 (describing reduced risk associated with negotiated
investments).
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and within the context of the legal and structural regime. 95 Unfortunately ,
the evidence does not suggest that friendly transactions actually increase
firm value. The very fact that a friendly transaction is negotiated between
the investor and the target company presents the potential for abuse of the
relationship to generate private gains for the investor rather than gains to
common shareholders. 9 6
Professor Bernard Black conducted the other major examination of the
empirical evidence on the value of institutional monitoring. In a recent
article, Professor Black analyzed a variety of studies on the relationship
between active investment strategies such as block acquisitions, control
transactions, and proxy initiatives and shareholder returns .97 He concluded
that evidence of the value of institutional monitoring was quite l imited,
although there was "some direct evidence that large outside shareholders
do valuable monitoring, or at least that their presence correlates with
improved performance. "9 8
Importantly, Professor Black identified a number of methodological
problems with existing studies of the value of institutional monitoring that
also appl y to the Gordon Group study. These problems include small
sample size, failure to control for the signaling effect of institutional
investor purchases and for the effect of outside factors on stock price, and
inability to design studies that examine the effect of investor oversight as
opposed simply to investor presence. 99 This last point is particularly
problematic: it means that the studies do not provide evidence as to
whether an investor's participation in decisionmaking, the key element of
relationship investing, is responsible for improving corporate performance.
Indeed, a serious question about the value of relationship investing
95 Corporations have successfully created major backlashes against investors who
seek to exercise too much control in an unfriendly manner. The activities of financial
conglomerates like the old House of Morgan, for example, led to a variety of legal
restrictions on the ability of banks to exercise control over portfolio companies. Most
.
recently, the involvement of institutional investors in encouraging corporate takeovers
led to criticism that investors were destroying U.S. business in favor of short-term
profits and generated a variety of state antitakeover statutes.
96 See discussion of private gains infra part IV.C.
97 Black, supra note 76, at 9 1 7-27.
9 8 /d. at 897.
99 /d. at 9 1 7-27. The success of the Brown Brothers Harriman 1 8 1 8 Fund
provides some anecdotal evidence that the presence of a large investor may contribute
to increased returns even when the investor does not engage in monitoring. The Fund
takes large but noncontrolling stakes in companies that it perceives as undervalued but
well-managed and thus not in need of active monitoring. Returns from the first of two
such funds have averaged more than 25 % annually. Wayne , supra note 82, at D22.
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concerns the competence of institutional investors as corporate
decisionmakers . Apart from the question of whether institutions have the
ability to influence, it is not clear that they have the necessary expertise to
improve performance. Particularly with respect to more intrusive
participation, such as setting corporate policy, defining l imitations on
capital expenditures, and selecting directors and management, there is little
reason to believe that the individuals who exercise voting power on behalf
of institutional investors will be able to do better than existing
management. In this respect, comparing activism by institutional investors
to the guidance provided by individuals such as Warren Buffett is
misleading. 1 00
Most fund managers have l ittle experience in operating industrial
corporations . Moreover, it is frequently difficult to distinguish poor
corporate performance due to management defects from problems beyond
the control of the corporation such as industry-wide declines or
technological changes . Many of the "underperforming" companies that
have been targeted for institutional activism have been experiencing major
business problems for a number of years and have been unable to turn their
performance around in spite of aggressive strategic changes . 1 0 1 Under these
circumstances, it is hard to understand how a group of civil servants ,
bankers, and investment advisors will make the corporation perform
better. 102
A recent example is the troubled performance of Eastman Kodak
Company. Kodak has been one of the investments targeted by the LENS
fund 103 and other institutional activists and has been unable to improve its
performance in spite of persistent pressure by outside investors . Kodak's
attempts to respond have included numerous restructurings as well as
personnel changes designed to invigorate the company with new
leadership . 104 To date, these efforts have not satisfied critics who claim
1 00 See Dobrzynski , supra note 5 (citing Buffett's counseling and board positions
on many of his portfolio companies as evidence of the existence and profitability of
p
relationship investing) .
10 1 See, e.g. , Rohatyn supra note 5 (questioning ability of institutional investors
to anticipate corporate performance problems and identify appropriate solutions).
102 See William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference ?, HARv. Bus.
REv. , Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 81 (questioning whether institutional investors have the
expertise to propose business solutions for troubled companies) .
103 Wayne, supra note 82, at D22.
104 For a chronicle of developments at Kodak over the last year, see Mark
Maremont & Elizabeth Lesly, Getting the Picture, Bus. WK. , Feb . 1 , 1993 , at 24;
Eric D. Randall, Whitmore: 'We will deliver ', USA TODAY, May 1 3 , 1993 , at B2;
Change 's Pace Costs Kodak CEO, CHI. TRIB . , Aug . 7, 1993 , at 1 (describing
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that the company has failed to adapt to the changing world. 1 05
Similarly, recent news reports have described the problems of stagnant
revenues and earnings at Borden, Inc . 1 06 Although a variety of institutions
have contacted Borden's management and offered advice on how to
improve corporate performance, there is little consensus, even among the
investors, about what steps to take. 1 07 Although investor activism may
pressure a corporation into taking steps that management had identified as
necessary but resisted for personal or political reasons , cases l ike Kodak
and Borden illustrate that it is less likely that investors will be able to
identify the means to improve poor performance.
C.

Private Gains

The possible divergence of an institutional investor's interests from
those of other shareholders creates a second reason for concern about the
ability of institutions to act as effective monitors . 1 08 A decision that
maximizes value from the perspective of the institution might not be
optimal from the perspective of other investors . 1 09 The fact that a corporate

institutional investor complaints leading to radical restructuring efforts and selection of
Christopher Steffen as chief financial officer, departure of Steffen eleven weeks later,
and subsequent ousting of CEO Kay Whitmore amid charges that he failed to respond
quickly enough to investors' concerns). Interestingly, the reports of institutional
activism, which seemingly led nowhere in terms of corporate performance,
nonetheless generated an increase in Kodak's stock price from around $43/share in
January 1993 to a 52-week high of $58/share in August.
1 05 Change 's Pace Costs Kodak CEO, supra note 104, at 1 (quoting Brenda
Landry, an investment analyst at Morgan Stanley) ; see also Hubert B. Herring, At
Kodak, No Quick Fixes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec . 1 9 , 1993 , at F2 (describing plunge in
Kodak stock price in December 1993 in response to statements by new chairman
George Fisher explaining difficulty of solving Kodak's earnings problems) .
1 06 See, e.g. , Alison L. Cowan, Advice Alone Can 't Cure Borden, N.Y. TIMES ,
Dec. 12, 1993 , at F 1 3 .
107 See id. (describing advice ranging from recruiting more food industry
veterans onto the board of directors to hiring executives with turnaround expertise,
and from recommending spin-offs of unprofitable divisions of the company to
suggesting a sale of the entire company to a competitor such as Nestle).
1 08 See, e.g. , Coffee, supra note 10, at 1328-36 (describing various ways in
which investment objectives of institutional investors may rationally diverge from
those of other shareholders or from the best interests of the corporation) .
l 09 For example, a state employees ' pension fund may be pressured to invest in
and be supportive of local business. This pressure may translate into limiting the
investor's ability to support efficiency-driven corporate decisions if they would have
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decision may not affect all shareholders equally means that both the
investor's evaluation of corporate performance and its determination of
changes in corporate decisionmaking may be based on its private interests
that are distinct from interests common to the entire shareholder class. 1 1 o
A lack of complete alignment between the interests of the institutional
investor and other shareholders may generate a variety of effects, the
complete analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article. The
potential divergence of interest is significant, however, for the problem
posed here, because it provides an alternative explanation both for
increasing shareholder activism and for the ability of some relationship
investors to achieve superior returns : the monitoring investor may be using
relationship investing to generate private gains for itself rather than
improved profits for the target corporation.
The monitoring model described above and the advocates of
relationship investing share a common assumption: that a monitoring
investor will use its influence to increase, in a general way, the value of
the target company. Hence returns from monitoring will be shared by all
shareholders in proportion to their ownership interest. 1 1 1 Such returns
might be described as public gains from monitoring. Alternatively,
however, the influence can be used to produce returns that accrue to the
monitoring shareholder in some proportion greater than the shareholder's
ownership interest. We might term any such excess returns as private
gains . 1 12
an adverse impact on in-state interests, such as jobs. From the investor's perspective,
it is not making an irrational choice; it is simply recognizing an interest not common
to other shareholders as part of the calculus.
1 1 ° For an example of a rational divergence between the interests of an indexed
institutional investor and those of other shareholders with respect to the desirability of
takeovers, see Wingerson & Dorn, supra note 77. Wingerson and Dorn observe that
an indexed investor is essentially invested in all companies and therefore benefits from
reducing the cost of intercompany transactions such as takeovers, even if the
transactions are not beneficial from the perspective of a particular company. "In
addition, indexed investors tend to benefit from reduced competition within an
industry, and takeovers are a legal means of reducing competition. Id. at 247-48 .
1 1 1 It is possible to create a more complicated version of the model in which side
payments are permitted to enable shareholders to overcome collective action
problems. Such a model would retain the assumption that monitoring will result in a
net gain to all shareholders but would relax the assumption of pro rata distribution of
that gain.
1 12 To the extent that an investor is able to generate returns that accrue
exclusively to it, the entire gain is a private gain. If, however, the investor merely
receives a greater proportion of the gain than other shareholders, only the excess
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Private gains can result from any situation in which the monitoring
investor can obtain a benefit not generally available to other investors . For
example, an investor can use its influence over an issuer to achieve private
gains in connection with control transactions such as corporate
takeovers, 1 1 3 from personalized securities transactions such as the sale to
an investor of "sweetheart preferred stock, " and by obtaining preferential
treatment in business transactions between itself and the issuer . 1 1 4
In the mathematical model, private gains operate in the exact reverse
manner of monitoring costs : they accrue exclusively to the benefit of the
monitoring shareholder. Thus, we can reflect private gains in the
mathematical model simply by adding them as a positive return on the
investment. If an investor's private gains from monitoring investment i are
designated as P(i), the gains available from monitoring will be p. ' (i) (A (i)IT
M(i)IZ) C(m) a(A (i)IT) + P(i), and the investor will monitor as long
as those gains are greater than zero. 1 1 5 Moreover, private gains are
frequently less speculative than gains through monitoring. 1 1 6 Thus a
rational investor is likely to be at least as will ing to receive private gains as
public gains as a result of relationship investing.
Friendly relationships between l arge investors and management can,
and often do, result in the creation of private gains . 1 1 7 For example, a
-

-

-

return constitutes a private gain.
1 1 3 It is generally assumed that control transactions provide both public and
private gains. The control premium is a public gain, which is distributed to all
shareholders. A private gain is also necessary, however, to justify the costs of the
acquisition to the purchasing shareholder. Depending on one's view of the economics
of the corporate takeover, the private gain may be properly attributable to economies
of scale, intracorporate business transactions, or the ability to select more efficient
replacement management-as suggested by those in favor of the hostile tender offer.
Alternatively, the gain may result from the acquirer's ability to exploit or loot target
company assets-the explanation of those who would regulate tender offers.
1 1 4 See also Peter V. Letsou , Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate
Control, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 780 ( 1 992) (describing the ability of a shareholder to
use the corporate proxy machinery to obtain publicity regarding issues of particular
concern to that shareholder as another example of private gains) .
1 1 5 Because private gains are not shared with other shareholders, they do not
affect the market rate of return, and , on a relative basis, they still provide an absolute
benefit to the monitoring shareholder. Accordingly, for any given level of monitoring
expenditures, private returns can be viewed as a constant, like monitoring costs.
1 1 6 See Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55 , at 1003 .
1 1 7 An active investor can achieve private gains even i f i t has a n unfriendly
relationship with management, but the opportunities to generate such gains are more
limited.
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friendly investor may make its investment i n a target company through the
purchase of a different type of security or different class of stock than that
owned by public shareholders . 1 1 8 This relationship offers the opportunity
for the investor to receive a return that differs from that available to
common shareholders . 1 1 9
The risk is that a friendly investor can receive private gains even if its
monitoring does not add value to the target corporation and even if other
shareholders do not benefit . In the extreme case, the investor may use its
influence to appropriate corporate value for itself without improving
corporate performance at all . 120 Professor Rock, who has done the most
1 1 8 Frequently the investor will purchase what is known as "sweetheart"
preferred stock. The investor may receive private gains because the stock is sold at a
lower price than it would fetch on the open market, or because the stock has special
attributes such as conversion rights, lower risk or higher dividend payments. This type
of securities transaction may result from management's desire to secure an infusion of
"friendly capital " for the purposes of protecting the autonomy of existing
management. In such a case, the investor is receiving sweetheart preferred stock as a
form of protection money.
On the other hand , some commentators defend the practice of placing a large
block of corporate securities in friendly hands by arguing that, among other things,
this type of transaction insulates management from so-called distorted discipline,
which might include overly aggressive threats of takeovers that prevent management
from acting in the long-term interests of shareholders. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Peter
Cramton, An Agency Perspective on Relational Investing (prelim. draft 1 993) (on file
with author) . If this explanation is correct, the placement will ultimately increase
returns to all shareholders by allowing management to run the corporation more
effectively. A study conducted by Wruck examines the effect of announcements of
private block sales by corporations of new equity, both common and preferred , on
common stock price. Wruck concludes that the announcements have a net positive
effect on common stock prices of approximately 4.5 % and attributes the price
increases to the market's belief that the presence of a concentrated monitor will
increase long-term performance and value. Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration
and Finn Value: Evidence from Private Equity Finandngs, 23 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1 989) .
1 1 9 In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 7 1 7 (Del. 197 1), the court
suggested that it would be a breach of fiduciary duty for a controlling shareholder to
use its influence to pay dividends only to itself, even by use of a distinct class of stock.
Most institutional stakes are too small, however, to subject investors to the fiduciary
duties imposed on controlling shareholders.
120 A pure economic analysis might evaluate the institution's influence in terms of
net social gains by weighing the gain by the institution against the loss suffered by
other investors. Most people would reject such an approach and require that
institutional monitoring produce results that were at least pareto superior. In other
words, a minimum criterion for effective institutional monitoring is that it increase
returns to some investors without decreasing the return to anyone. A more demanding
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extensive work o n the subject o f private gains to date, describes this
scenario as " 'corrupt' relational investing. " 12 1
For example, Professor Rock describes the purchase by Corporate
Partners 122 of a special class of Polaroid preferred stock in exchange for
protecting Polaroid against a tender offer by Diamond Shamrock. 123 Over a
two-and-a-half year period, Corporate Partners earned an annual return of
nearly twenty percent on its investment. 124 Polaroid common stock
declined in value during the same time period. 125 The case illustrates the
possibility that Corporate Partners' success in generating superior returns
for its fund may reflect its willingness to assist management rather than its
ability to improve corporate performance.
Institutions may also use their influence to improve their business
relationships with the target company . 126 For example, although the
relationship between the House of Morgan and the corporations in which it
invested is often cited as an example of the effectiveness of relationship
investing, 127 the Morgan Bank enj oyed a variety of business relationships
standard would require that monitoring provide at least some public gains and not
benefit the institutional investor exclusively.
121 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 989.
122 Corporate Partners bills itself as " 'organized to make friendly investments,
usually by taking large minority equity positions of approximately 1 0 % to 3 0 % in
publicly held companies which could benefit from the presence of a large supportive
shareholder. . . . " ' It has also described itself as " 'able to provide insulation from
market operators and hostile acquirers. . . . ' " Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp . ,
709 F . Supp. 13 1 1 , 1326 (D. Del. 1989) (quoting Corporate Partners' descriptive
brochure) .
123 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 990-93.
124 /d. at 993 . The return resulted from a combination of profits from the resale
of the stock to Polaroid and $30 million in dividends payable on the preferred stock.
125 /d.
126 Improved business relationships are a possible explanation for the synergistic
monitoring achieved by the Japanese keiretsu. Members of the keiretsu have a web of
business relationships, including those of debtor-creditor and customer-supplier. See,
e.g. , Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 87 1 , 88283 (1993) ; Roe, Differences, supra note 57, at 1985-86. The keiretsu allows the large
block holders to improve their business operations through active monitoring and also
serves to reduce risk and opportunistic behavior associated with the investor's business
dealings with the target company. Such improvements all constitute private gains.
127 E.g. , David P. Hale, Learning from Germany and Japan, WALL ST. J. , Feb.
4, 1 99 1 , at A10 (arguing that American banks such as Morgan were effective
corporate monitors until the early 1900s); cj. Garten, supra note 57, at 590 n. 1 5
(describing as "surprising" the number o f scholars who cite the House o f Morgan as
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with issuers through which it received gains not available to other
equityholders and gains that may not have reflected value added by
Morgan. 1 28
Professor Rock argues that Lazard Freres, the manager of the
Corporate Partners fund, has been able to take similar advantage of
Corporate Partners' investments to achieve increased investment banking
business (and fees) . 1 29 For example, Rock describes the fact that Lazard
Freres earned over fourteen mill ion dollars in investment banking fees
from its involvement with Transco Energy Company during the time
period 1989 through 1 992. During that same time period, Corporate
Partners owned $ 125 mill ion of a special issue of convertible preferred
stock, representing nine percent of the voting power of Transco . l3 0
E . I . du Pont de Nemours & Company (Du Pont)'s relationship with
General Motors in the early 1 900s provides Rock with another illustration
of an investor's ability to use its power to generate improved business . 13 1
In 1 9 17, Du Pont purchased approximately twenty-three percent of the
stock of General Motors . 1 3 2 During the subsequent forty years, Du Pont
exercised a substantial amount of influence over General Motors' policies,
exemplifying the type of long-term investor/issuer relationship currently in
vogue. 1 33 In the course of this relationship, General Motors purchased an
increasing percentage of its paints, finishes, and coated fabrics from Du
Pont.
Eventually, the United States brought a successful antitrust suit against
Du Pont, claiming that Du Pont's acquisition of General Motors stock had
resulted in Du Pont obtaining an illegal preference over its competitors in
product sales to General Motors . Although it is not clear that Du Pont had
the model of an effective institutional investor) .
1 28 See Garten, supra note 57, at 590 (describing power of institutional investors
like the old House of Morgan as arising "from multiple financial and professional
relationships with a firm . . . . The institution's role as lender, underwriter, and
financial advisor made it a true partner of management. ") .
1 29 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55 , at 998-99.
1 3 0 Corporate Partners purchased the stock in early 1989.
1 3 1 Indeed , Professor Louis Lowenstein cites the relationship between Du Pont
and GM in the 1 920s as a model for contemporary relationship investing. LoUis
LoWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 21 1-17 (1991).
1 3 2 The history and nature of the acquisition are described in United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 353 U.S. 586 , 600-02 (1957).
1 33 See, e.g. , Louis Lowenstein, More Like Whom ?, Opening Remarks,
Conference on Relational Investing, at 12 (Appendix) (New York, May 6 , 1993) (on
file with author) (describing the Du Pont/General Motors relationship as an illustration
of relational investing) .
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received preferential treatment as a result of its actual or perceived
influence over General Motors' purchasing decisions, 1 34 the Supreme
Court's majority opinion observed that " [t]he inference is overwhelming
that Du Pont's commanding position [as supplier to General Motors] was
promoted by its stock interest and was not gained solely on competitive
merit. " 1 35
The ability to create private gains at the expense of other shareholders
is not limited to private institutional investors . Efforts by public pension
funds to influence corporate policies to address political rather than
economic concerns can also be viewed as a type of private gain. A pension
fund may, for example, be able to extract concessions from portfolio
companies to benefit local constituencies, such as in-state employment
commitments . 1 36 Although it is not clear that activism focused on creation
of jobs or preservation of in-state business will result in poorer economic
performance by target companies , 1 3 7 this type of strategy has the potential
to place the goals of the fund in conflict with those of other shareholders .
The creation of private gains means that the decision to monitor may
be completely unrelated to the creation of value for common shareholders .
In other words, rational monitoring decisions, according to the model , will
sometimes result in shareholder activism that does not generally improve
corporate performance. If private gains are not available, shareholders will
sometimes continue to forgo activism that would benefit the target
company. The availability of private gains creates an incentive for an
institutional investor to use its influence to appropriate existing corporate
value rather than to improve corporate performance . 1 3 8
1 34 The dissenting opinion takes issue with the majority on precisely this point.
See Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 627-46 (Burton, J . , dissenting) (analyzing purchasing
decisions by General Motors and concluding that decisions were made on the basis of
competitive merit and did not result from Du Pont's participation or influence in
General Motors' affairs) .
1 35 Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
1 36 For example, a recent article described the views of Olena Berg, the new
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Pension and Welfare Benefits, as encouraging pension
funds to focus on investments targeted to increase jobs. Wayne, supra note 65, at D l .
See also Vanecko, supra note 3 , at 4 13 (noting that pension funds may respond to
citizens' political concerns in making investment decisions regardless of whether the
political investing is in the best interests of fund beneficiaries).
1 3 7 See Wayne, supra note 65, at D 14 (describing mixed track record of
"economically targeted investments" by pension funds) .
1 3 8 See Letsou, supra note 1 14, at 780-90 (describing various ways an
institutional investor can use its influence to extract private gains rather than to benefit
the corporation) .
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Professor Rock describes the ability of an institution to maxtmlZe its
self-interest at the expense of corporate value as the "dark side " of
relationship investing. 139 Courts and commentators have traditionally
viewed the generation of private gains as a corruption of the investor's
relationship with its portfolio company . 1 40 This conclusion is, however,
too facile. The use of investor influence to create private gains should not
be viewed as per se proof that the influence is being used inappropriately .
The better inquiry is whether the relationship results i n a net gain to other
stockholders.
In other words , a relationship that generates greater profits for all
shareholders and an additional quantity of exclusively private gains
provides both a net benefit to the corporation and a pareto superior
outcome. 1 4 1 This type of activism should be encouraged even if the
monitoring investor receives more than a pro rata share of that benefit. 1 42
The private gains may be viewed as compensation for the particular costs
and risks borne by the monitoring investor. Within the context of the
overall relationship, private gains offer a potential solution to the
disincentive created by free riding.
The problem is that the empirical evidence, to date, offers no way to
distinguish between good instances of relationship investing and "corrupt"
relationships}43 In other words, the evidence does not establish whether
monitoring creates value. Moreover, liberalization of judicial views toward

1 39 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55.
1 40 See, e.g. , Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 1 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955) (requiring controlling shareholder to share his sale premium on a pro
rata basis with the minority shareholders); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. , 460 P.2d
464 (Cal. 1969) (finding breach of fiduciary duty where group of controlling
shareholders used their influence to obtain benefits not available to minority
shareholders) ; cf. Sinclair Oil Corp . v. Levien, 280 A.2d 7 1 7 (Del. 197 1) (appropriate
test for determining whether controlling shareholder has abused its position is whether
controlling shareholder receives value from the company to the exclusion of the
minority shareholders).
1 4 1 The requirement of pareto superiority is that no investor's position is made
worse as a result of the institutional participation.
1 42 For an application of similar analysis to the sale of control by large block
investors, see Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59
U. CHI. L. REv. 1465 (1 992) .
1 43 See, e. g. , Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 995 (recent
empirical work suggests that the relatively superior returns identified in relationship
investing are likely the result of the creation of private gains) .
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private gains poses a danger of its own: the danger that a monitoring
shareholder will retain all of the gains created by monitoring or go even
further and actually reduce returns to common shareholders . 1 44
In many ways , the problem of assessing the value of institutional
activism is similar to the question posed in the early 1980s about whether
insider trading should be deregulated . Advocates of deregulation argued
that the private gains available to corporate officials through insider trading
were more than offset by gains to the corporation, including the ability to
attract competent management for lesser salaries and improved corporate
performance. 1 45 Thus, according to these commentators, deregulatio n
would allow corporate insiders to generate private gains, the allocation o f
which could b e determined by contract between the insiders and the
corporation. 1 46 The private gains would give insiders the incentive to
create corporate value, and the incentive structure would cost the
corporation less than achieving the same objectives through direct
compensation . 1 47
Critics of deregulation raised a variety of concerns about the
deleterious effect of insider trading . In particular, they responded to the
foregoing argument by suggesting that there was no reason to suppose
insiders would perform more diligently, thereby increasing corporate
value, if they were given the right to trade on inside information. 1 48 It was
1 44 Indeed, the Gordon Group Study recommends that CalPERS exercise caution
that high returns to the activist fund not come at the expense of its common
stockholdings. Gordon Group Study, supra note 58, at 46 . Presumably this concern
identifies the possibility that private gains may be generated not simply as an
alternative to public gains, but as an adjunct to public losses.
1 45 See, e.g. , Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel , The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN . L. REv. 857 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and
Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 27 (1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading:
Rule JOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD . 801 (1980).
1 46 See also Jill E . Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 1 79 , 224-26 (199 1) (describing argument
that the use of inside information should be allocated, as other property rights, by
private contract) .
1 47 See also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 145 , at 870-7 1 (using insider trading
to compensate executives may lead to desirable management behavior) ; Ronald A .
Dye, Insider Trading and Incentives, 5 7 J. Bus. 295 (1984) (describing econometric
analysis of insider trading as compensation).
1 48 See, e.g. , Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 4 1
STAN. L . REv. 377, 386 (1989) (arguing that inability o f shareholders to monitor may
result in managers failing to maximize shareholder wealth) ; see also Fisch, supra note
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also not clear that insiders would agree to accept reduced salaries in
exchange for the ability to trade on inside information. Thus, if the private
gains of insider trading were viewed within the context of the relationship
between the corporate official and the corporation, existing empirical
evidence could not determine whether allowing private gains would benefit
the corporation. 1 49
Although this Article suggests caution, for the same reasons, in
viewing increased institutional activism as the remedy for poor
performance by United States corporations, the questions posed by
relationship investing can be answered . The next step in studying the value
of institutional investing requires recognition of the fact that institutional
presence, by itself, is not evidence of monitoring. Moreover, even if stock
price, in the short run, responds to the announcement of a block position,
the block investor need not be improving corporate performance. There is
a considerable difference between institutional presence and institutional
voice.
V. CONCLUSION

Institutions are the new darlings of the corporate governance
movement. Many commentators are convinced that institutions present a
vehicle for improving United States corporate decisionmaking and
efficiency. Yet the value of the institutional investor depends on its
decision to participate actively in corporate monitoring. This Article has
suggested that, in the absence of an opportunity for institutions to achieve
some private gains, the risks of active investing for most institutional
investors outweigh the benefits . Accordingly, it may be appropriate to take
a more l iberal view of private gains, by considering them within the
context of the monitoring relationship . Before the legal constraints on an
146 , at 219 n . 1 8 1 (describing additional problems with using insider trading as
management compensation, including the risk of moral hazard) .
1 49 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS : THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 8 1 , 90-97 (J. Pratt & R.
Zeckhauser eds. , 1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 309 ,
332 (1981) ; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Trading on Inside
Information, 36 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD 10, 14 (1990) (private contract theory may
not achieve optimal allocation of the property rights in information due to a variety of
factors, including the difficulty in enforcing contracts that restrict insider trading
because of the practical problems of detecting improper trades; accordingly,
deregulation of insider trading may not be beneficial for corporations) .
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investor's ability to generate private gains are relaxed to facilitate
relationship investing, however, it should be established that institutional
monitoring will actually add value to United States corporations . For
relationship investing to be socially beneficial , it must generate gains to
public shareholders, as well as private gains . Its ability to create such
public value remains, as yet, uncertain.
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